Countering the Laundering of Drug Proceeds through Cryptocurrencies in Ukraine: Theoretical Foundations, Administrative Mechanisms and Criminal-Law Means

Author(s): Maksym Maksimentsev*, Yuliia Khrystova, Halyna Tatarenko, Denys Yuriev, Yevhen Yakovykh

Abstract

Aim: Over the past few years, retail drug selling in Ukraine has migrated to Telegram storefronts and darknet platforms where buyers settle in crypto, above all in dollar-pegged stablecoins. Sellers then turn these tokens back into hryvnias through Peer-to-Peer (P2P) deals, cash desks that trade over the counter and rented (“drop”) bank accounts. Ukrainian legislation addresses only separate links of this chain: Since 2020 the anti-money laundering statute has counted crypto-service providers as obliged entities, the 2022 law on virtual assets is still not in force, and Article 306 of the criminal code continues to speak of banks, enterprises and privatised property. The paper examines how theoretical concepts, administrative tools and criminal-law means can be combined so that drug money moving through virtual assets is detected, stopped and recovered.

Methods: Doctrinal, comparative and typological methods were applied. The legal material comprised the substantive and procedural criminal codes, the administrative offences code, the Anti-Money Laundering (AML) statute of 2019, the dormant 2022 statute on virtual assets, civil code provisions on digital things, the statute on the asset recovery agency and bills Nos. 10225-? and 16013. International material included Financial Action Task Force (FATF) standards, Markets in CryptoAssets Regulation (MiCA) and the other European Union (EU) acts on crypto-asset transfers, money laundering and confiscation, together with four confiscation judgments of the Strasbourg court. Empirical data came from typology studies, official statistics, blockchain-analytics reports and enforcement cases of 2024-2026.

Results: Drug money typically enters crypto at the moment of payment, is layered through P2P trades, token swaps and self-custody wallets, and is integrated via rented accounts, cash and offshore platforms. The points at which value changes form and an identifiable person must appearconversion nodes-are where the law can intervene. Administrative rules nominally cover these nodes (customer due diligence from Ukrainian Hryvnia (UH) 30,000, wallet data accompanying transfers, suspension powers), yet without a licensing regime for domestic providers they bite mainly on banks. Criminal law is inconsistent: The general laundering offence (Article 209 CC) applies to virtual assets as property, but Article 306, the specific offence on drug proceeds, does not capture conversion into crypto, and the October 2026 offence on supplying accounts to fraudsters is limited to fraud and silent on crypto wallets. Seizing virtual assets has become common, whereas their custody, sale and restitution still hinge on foreign exchanges and on divergent judicial approaches.

Conclusion: Virtual assets need to be recognised as a separate object of both Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulation and criminal-law protection. The paper offers a model with three tiers-control at the gateway, interruption of flows, and response with asset recovery-and proposes changes to Article 306, to the new account-supply offence, to the suspension and covert-investigation rules and to the procedure for seizing, holding and realising virtual assets, including a rebuttable presumption, compatible with the convention, concerning crypto-assets of persons convicted of drug trafficking.

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